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Objectives: In 2017 the WHO published a global priority list of 12 antibiotic-resistant bacteria (ARB) in
urgent need of new antibiotics. We aimed to identify and assess publicly accessible mandatory sur-
veillance systems and outbreaks reporting for these pathogens in the 28 European Union and four Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association member states.
Methods: Compulsory reporting was mapped by reviewing national documents without applying lan-
guage restrictions and through expert consultation. Information on surveillance targets, indicators,
metrics and dissemination modalities was extracted and a qualitative assessment was performed for
open access systems only.
Results: Twenty-one countries (66%) had a mandate to survey at least one among the 12 WHO priority
pathogens; 15 provided access to surveillance frameworks. These systems covered most frequently
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriales (12; 38%), methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (12; 38%),
and vancomycin-resistant enterococci (8; 25%). None of the European countries required reporting of
resistance in Salmonella, Campylobacter, Helicobacter pylori and Neisseria gonorrhoeae. High heterogeneity
was observed in data collection, reporting and dissemination among countries with clinical outcomes
and risk factors being reported in less than half (22% and 25%). Only six countries (19%) implemented
mandatory surveillance of outbreaks due to at least one WHO priority pathogen.
Conclusions: Our review shows that despite the increasing burden of ARB on the European population,
very few countries implemented mandatory surveillance and outbreak reporting of the WHO priority
pathogens. International efforts are needed to define the effectiveness of implementing mandatory
reporting of these pathogens and to assess their role in reducing the spread of ARB in health-care and
community settings. N. Babu Rajendran, Clin Microbiol Infect 2019;▪:1
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of European Society of Clinical Microbiology and
Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ision of Infectious Diseases,
ospital Tübingen, Tübingen,
ni-tuebingen.de (N. Babu
Ltd on behalf of European Society
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Surveillance in infectious diseases includes the monitoring and
recording of the occurrence of an infection and the frequency with
which it occurs, enriched by additional data such as environmentalof Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under
and outbreaks reporting of the WHO priority pathogens for research
gy and Infection, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2019.11.020
Fig. 1. European countries with mandatory surveillance of antibiotic resistant bacteria
included as high and critical priorities for research and discovery of new antibiotics by
WHO [12]. Colours indicate notifications by number of WHO priority pathogens.
Countries with publicly accessible mandatory surveillance include: Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland/Liechtenstein, United Kingdom (Scotland and England only). *The
Netherlands: law under implementation at the time of study. Poland requires
reporting of infections due to bacteria resistant to selected antibiotics; specifications
on the pathogeneantibiotic combination were unavailable.
N. Babu Rajendran et al. / Clinical Microbiology and Infection xxx (xxxx) xxx2and patient factors that could influence incidence and spread of the
disease. This process carried out in a systematic way together with
timely analysis of data provides the evidence for decision-makers
to organize effective infection control measures. In addition, sur-
veillance of antibiotic-resistant bacteria (ARB) more specifically
provides essential choices for appropriate empirical therapy of in-
fections [1e3]. Data collected within the national and local sur-
veillance systems could drive the usage of antibiotics in hospital
and community settings and so can impact the resistance rates in
the future [4].
International surveillance programmes are an important means
of tracking significant threats at a global level, while local surveil-
lance systems (such as in health-care facilities) are pivotal for the
implementation of infection control measures and locally tailored
therapeutic guidelines [5]. Data for surveillance systems may be
collected by voluntary and/or mandatory participation. Mandatory
reporting usually follows significant observed increases in rate of
resistance and/or society or patients' clinical burden. A typical
example is the mandatory surveillance implemented in 2001 in
England after a significant increase in bloodstream infections due
to methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Improve-
ment of surveillance was one of the executive pillars that contrib-
uted to a significant decrease in MRSA bloodstream infections [6,7].
Travels and transfers of patients among countries play a signif-
icant role in the spread of resistance [8], and the European Union
(EU) has called for united policies and strategies across borders to
combat public health threats [9]. Since 2010, the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control has been building up a volun-
tary network of national public health organizations and in-
stitutions to define risk of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) at local
level and inform policy-makers [10]. However, a recent systematic
review that mapped 42 voluntary regional and national systems in
the 28 EU and 4 European Free Trade Association member states
collecting data on resistance in humans showed persisting high
heterogeneity of reporting among systems, and a lack of incidence-
based indicators, clinical outcomes and risk factors data [11]. The
WHO recently prioritized ARB according to the burden in hospital
and community, the availability of infection control measures, and
the need for new, effective antibiotics. The list included 12 patho-
gens, and multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriales, Acinetobacter bau-
mannii and Pseudomonas aeruginosa were categorized as critical
priority [12]. Although surveillance of infectious diseases associ-
ated with a high risk of burden and spreading such as tuberculosis,
influenza and rabies is mandatory in all European countries, na-
tional policies for reporting of multidrug-resistant bacteria
responsible for high morbidity in many European countries are still
unclear and no guidelines are currently available.
The aim of this study was to map and describe publicly acces-
sible mandatory reporting of infections, colonization and outbreaks
in humans due to theWHO priority pathogens within the European
region and to identify gaps and potential needs to be addressed in
the European surveillance networks.
Methods
The target bacteria were the 12 high and critical WHO priority
pathogens, selected based on the results of a multicriterion deci-
sion analysis incorporating several criteria including mortality,
hospital and community transmissibility, and treatment options
[12]. Mandatory surveillance was defined as the process of
compulsory reporting of occurrence of WHO priority pathogens by
laboratories and/or health-care facilities as stipulated by national
laws or regulations. Mandatory notifications required by regional,
i.e. state or administrative divisions within a country, were not
included in this study. Using this definition, mandatory reporting inPlease cite this article as: Babu Rajendran N et al., Mandatory surveillance
& discovery of new antibiotics in European countries, Clinical MicrobioloEurope (defined as EU member states and European Free Trade
Association countries) was mapped using a combination of search
terms. Key words included ‘obligatory’, ‘mandatory’, ‘reporting’,
‘notification’, ‘infectious disease’, ‘registry’, ‘antibiotic’, ‘antimicro-
bial’, ‘resistance’. These terms were used in various combinations
together with the country name, for example, ‘mandatory reporting
infectious disease AND Estonia’ OR ‘mandatory reporting resistance
AND Estonia’ OR ‘mandatory notification infectious disease AND
Estonia’. The search was performed using the Google search engine
in regional languages, and results were screened to identify
country-specific public health agencies, ministries of health or
official websites with mandates on infectious disease notifications.
When no mandatory notification and outbreaks reporting was
identified through the web-based search strategy, the European
Committee on Infection Control (EUCIC; with national committees
in 23 European countries devoted to prevention of infections) [[13]]
was contacted. For the five countries without a EUCIC national
committee, the national public health authorities were contacted.
Qualitative assessment to evaluate surveillance frameworks was
performed only for those countries that provided open access to
surveillance protocols and results. Variables for mandatory sur-
veillance included: target ARB, resistance definition, notification
criteria, data providers, notification period, notification method,
setting, sampling, specimen, infections monitored, microbiology
laboratory details, demographics, risk factor, outcome, public
feedback. Variables for outbreaks reporting included: target ARB,
resistance definition, notification period, notification method, dataand outbreaks reporting of the WHO priority pathogens for research
gy and Infection, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2019.11.020
Table 1
Mandatory surveillance of WHO priority pathogens in 32 European countries: target antibiotic-resistant bacteria
n (%) n (%)
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriales 12 (38) 4 (13)
Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii 5 (16) 3 (9)
Carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa 4 (13) 2 (6)
Third-generaƟon cephalosporin-resistant Enterobacteriales 7 (22) 2 (6)
Fluoroquinolone-resistant Salmonella 0 (0) 0 (0)
Fluoroquinolone-resistant Campylobacter 0 (0) 0 (0)
Third-generaƟon cephalosporin-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae 0 (0) 0 (0)
Fluoroquinolone-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae 0 (0) 0 (0)
Clarithromycin-resistant Helicobacter pylori 0 (0) 0 (0)
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 12 (38) 3 (9)
Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 3 (9) 2 (6)
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci 8 (25) 2 (6)





N. Babu Rajendran et al. / Clinical Microbiology and Infection xxx (xxxx) xxx 3providers, outbreak definition, outbreak setting, demographics,
reporting of transmission mode, reporting of control/intervention
measures, outcome, microbiology details, public feedback. Litera-
ture in languages other than English was translated by native
speakers or with the Google Translate web application.Results
Mandatory surveillance of WHO priority pathogens
Antibiotic resistance as primary surveillance target was part of
the mandates in 21 European countries (66%) (Fig. 1, Table 1)
Qualitative assessment was possible for 15 countries with public-
access information. In the UK both Scotland and England have
region-specific mandatory surveillance; for the analysis they were
assessed as one surveillance system. Raw data extracted from all
public-access mandatory AMR surveillances identified in this study
are available in the Supplementary material, file S1.Mandatory antibiotic resistance surveillance in gram-negative
bacteria
Among the 13 mandatory surveillance systems identified for
Gram-negative bacteria in 13 countries, carbapenem-resistant
Enterobacteriales was monitored by 12 (38%). Third-generation
cephalosporin-resistant Enterobacteriales (7; 22%), carbapenem-
resistant A. baumannii (5; 16%), and carbapenem-resistant
P. aeruginosa (4; 13%) were the other common pathogens under
surveillance. Infections were monitored in 4 (13%), and both in-
fections and colonizations were monitored in 8 (25%) (Table 2).
Type of infectionwas specified by only three systems (two invasive,
one bacteraemia). Data collection included resistance mechanism
(5; 16%), antibiotic susceptibility testing MIC or disc diffusion (mg/
mL or mm) (2; 6%) and antibiotic susceptibility testing interpreta-
tion (susceptible (S), intermediate (I), resistant (R)) (3; 9%) in a few
systems. Age and gender data were included in a majority of the
systems (11; 34%) whereas risk factors (invasive procedures, pre-
vious antibiotic use, previous hospitalization, co-morbidities) werePlease cite this article as: Babu Rajendran N et al., Mandatory surveillance
& discovery of new antibiotics in European countries, Clinical Microbiolocollected by only five systems (16%). Crude mortality was the only
clinical outcome reported (7; 22%). Surveillance data were publicly
available for nine systems (28%) and published either weekly (4;
13%) or yearly (5; 16%). Incidence as surveillance metric was used
by six systems (19%).Mandatory antibiotic resistance surveillance in gram-positive
bacteria
Among the 12 mandatory notifications systems identified for
Gram-positive bacteria in 12 countries, MRSAwas monitored by all,
vancomycin-resistant enterococci in 8 (25%) and vancomycin-
resistant S. aureus in three systems (9%). Infections were moni-
tored in 5 (16%), and both infections and colonizations were
monitored in 6 (19%). Types of infections under surveillance were
reported in only four systems (two bacteraemia, two invasive).
Provisions for reporting laboratory results were available in a few
surveillance systems: antibiotic susceptibility testing MIC or disc
diffusion (mg/mL or mm) (2; 6%), antibiotic susceptibility inter-
pretation (S, I, R) (3; 9%), and resistance mechanisms (5; 16%).
Patient-based age and gender were reported by all but two systems
(10; 31%), whereas risk factors and clinical outcome as crude
mortality were collected by five systems (16%). Access to recent
surveillance results was available for ten systems (31%), which
published weekly (3; 9%), monthly (3; 9%) or yearly (4; 13%) up-
dates. Incidence as a surveillance metric was used by 7 (22%) sur-
veillance systems.Mandatory reporting of outbreaks caused by WHO priority
pathogens
Mandatory reporting of outbreaks was identified in nine Euro-
pean countries, of which only six provided public access (19%).
Notification criteria and surveillance principles were diverse
among these (Table 3) but all provided access to surveillance results
with number of outbreaks being updated yearly (5; 16%) or weekly
(1; 3%). Four countries (13%) allowed reporting of all outbreaks
unrestricted by pathogens while two countries had indications onand outbreaks reporting of the WHO priority pathogens for research
gy and Infection, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2019.11.020
Table 2
Framework of publicly accessible mandatory surveillance of WHO priority pathogens: Gram-negative bacteria versus Gram-positive bacteria in Europe
Gram-negative (n ¼ 13) Gram-positive (n ¼ 12)
n (%) n (%)
Data collection
Notifying bodies Health-care professional/facility 3 (9) 3 (9)
Laboratory 4 (13) 4 (13)
Laboratory and health-care professional/facility 6 (19) 5 (16)
Notification method Notification forms 11 (34) 7 (22)
Web interface 5 (16) 6 (19)
Case definitions Infection 4 (13) 5 (16)
Infection and colonization 8 (25) 6 (19)
Infections monitored Invasive 2 (6) 2 (6)
Bacteraemia 1 (3) 2 (6)
Health-care-associated 1 (3) 1 (3)
Any 8 (25) 6 (19)
Resistance details Susceptibility results (MIC or Disc diffusion (mg/mL or mm)) 2 (6) 2 (6)
Antibiotic susceptibility interpretation (S/I/R) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Resistance mechanism 5 (16) 5 (16)
Age and gender Reported 11 (34) 10 (31)
Risk factorsa Device use (any) 1 (3) 4 (13)
Invasive procedures, including surgery 3 (9) 3 (9)
Previous hospitalization 1 (3) 4 (13)
Previous antibiotic use 1 (3) 1 (3)
Factors for infection acquisition (travel, contact, etc.) 4 (13) 3 (9)
Co-morbidities (any underlying condition) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Clinical outcome Mortality 7 (22) 5 (16)
Data dissemination
Public accessb Available 9 (28) 10 (31)
Not available 4 (13) 2 (6)
Publication frequency Weekly 4 (13) 3 (9)
Monthly 0 (0) 3 (9)
Yearly 5 (16) 4 (13)
Data stratification Age group and gender 4 (13) 6 (19)
Sampling (infection or colonization) 1 (3) 3 (9)
Specimen 2 (6) 2 (6)
Type of infection 1 (3) 1 (3)
Indicators Number of cases 8 (25) 9 (28)
Incidence 6 (19) 7 (22)
Total identified ¼ 15 surveillance systems in 15 countries.
a Individual risk factor definitions vary from system to system.
b Refers to electronic literature published on surveillance websites, excludes publication in peer-reviewed journals and scientific conferences.
Table 3
Framework of publicly accessible mandatory notification of outbreaks due to WHO
priority pathogens in Europe
N (%)
Data collection
Target resistance Any (unrestricted to pathogen) 4 (13)
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 2 (6)
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci 1 (3)
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriales 1 (3)
Third generation-resistant Enterobacteriales 1 (3)
Surveillance structure Mandatory notification of outbreaks 3 (9)
Mandatory notification of health-care-
associated outbreaks
2 (6)
Mandatory notification of clusters 1 (3)
Notification period Immediate 2 (6)
Notification method Notification forms 5 (16)
Web interface 5 (16)
Phone 1 (3)
Outbreak setting Hospital 1 (3)
Health-care facility 1 (3)
Health-care facility and community 4 (13)





Clinical outcome Mortality 3 (9)
Data dissemination
Publication frequency Weekly 1 (3)
Yearly 5 (16)
Total identified ¼ 6 surveillance systems in 6 countries.
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& discovery of new antibiotics in European countries, Clinical MicrobioloARB-specific outbreaks. Data on outbreaks included information on
transmission mode in five (16%), while prevention/intervention
measures undertaken to control outbreaks were reported by only
three (9%) surveillance systems.
Discussion
Our review shows that, although the burden of AMR at global
level has been clearly recognized, fewer than half of the European
countries (47%) implemented publicly accessible mandatory sur-
veillance of at least one ARB among the 12 pathogens identified by
WHO as in urgent need of new therapies [12]. Twelve countries
target at least one ‘critical’ bacterium (most frequently
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriales) and one ‘high priority’
bacterium (most frequently MRSA). Surveillance of ‘high priority’
fluoroquinolone-resistant Salmonella, Campylobacter, Neisseria
gonorrhoeae, third-generation cephalosporin-resistant
N. gonorrhoeae, and clarithromycin/metronidazole-resistant Heli-
cobacter pylori was not mandatory in any European country.
Notably, the type of data collected and disseminated differed be-
tween the 15 mandatory surveillance systems. Significant differ-
ences included heterogeneous definition of clinical samples,
screening and type of specimen included. Epidemiologically rele-
vant findings on resistance mechanisms, patient-based risk factors
and clinical outcomes data were collected by only half the systems.
Although surveillance results were frequently published as weekly
or monthly numbers on new cases, stratification of data byand outbreaks reporting of the WHO priority pathogens for research
gy and Infection, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2019.11.020
N. Babu Rajendran et al. / Clinical Microbiology and Infection xxx (xxxx) xxx 5specimen, infection type, risk factors and clinical outcomes was not
commonly in practice.
Mandatory notifications of outbreaks due to the WHO priority
pathogens seem also limited at European level. These notifications
could overcome publication bias associated with reporting of out-
breaks in peer-reviewed journal [14]. According to our study, only
six countries integrate publicly accessible outbreak reporting for
ARB and only one country provides numbers on outbreaks every
week. Reliable and timely surveillance data of outbreaks should
help to identify new patterns of resistance and could drive early
definition of effective infection control measures and interventions
necessary to reduce the spread of resistance [15].
This study has limitations. It focused only on high and critical
WHO priority pathogens without covering medium-priority path-
ogens. Although the authors believe that surveillance systems
should cover all WHO priority pathogens, the choice was based on
the values of the criteria used for the prioritization exercise, which
included, for high and critical priorities, lack of effective infection
control measures and treatments, and high mortality. Data were
extracted from openly available literature only. It is possible that
there are countries with mandatory reporting that do not provide
publicly accessible data. To overcome this gap, EUCIC members and
national surveillance representatives were contacted. No further
mandatory surveillances fitting the study objective could be
included. Some experts underlined that in their country they were
in the process of implementing the necessary infrastructure. For
example, in the Netherlands a law to make the reporting of
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriales mandatory is in prepara-
tion. In Italy, the recently developed national action plan is under
implementation and will include mandatory surveillance of most
relevant antibiotic resistance. Likewise in Malta, dedicated regula-
tions included in the national strategy will be formalized soon. The
design of national mandatory surveillance systems is carried out to
meet national objectives and action plans. Consequently, global, i.e.
inter-country, comparisons could introduce a bias in the quality of
surveillance methodologies and data dissemination. Of note, Sal-
monella and Campylobacter are under mandatory surveillance in
many European countries and notifications are not defined by
resistance to any target antibiotic. In countries such as Finland and
Croatia, isolates must be sent to national reference laboratories,
whereas Germany and Switzerland/Liechtenstein specify that they
must be sent on request. If indeed susceptibility testing is per-
formed (in local or national laboratories), resistance data for these
pathogens might not be included in the surveillance results.
Well-known limitations of mandatory notifications include
under-reporting and increased workload for public health author-
ities and expenditure [16e18]. In 2015 Bijkerk et al. [19] proposed a
decision aid to help policy-makers weigh the necessity of imple-
menting mandatory notification for any infectious disease under
question. According to the authors however, their guide could not
be applied to resistance monitoring because the disease to be sur-
veyed (i.e. isolation of ARB) is not only associated to diseases but
also to colonization which per se has no impact on an individual's
health. A study on Swedish mandatory surveillance data on
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriales indicates that inclu-
sion of clinical and screening samples facilitates flexible analysis
essential to understanding epidemiology of resistance [20].
Another issue to be considered is the difficulty in diagnosing
some of the bacteria regardless of the susceptibility patterns. For
example, testing for H. pylori can either be performed through the
breath test or gastric fluid culture. In the first case, no analysis of
resistance can be defined. However, even when cultured, suscep-
tibility testing of Helicobacter usually happens in larger and more
specialized laboratories. Another example is the Neisseria testing,
which is sometimes done solely using molecular methods, withoutPlease cite this article as: Babu Rajendran N et al., Mandatory surveillance
& discovery of new antibiotics in European countries, Clinical Microbiolotesting for resistance, therefore decreasing the quality of data that
could be collected for surveillance.
Current mandatory surveillance systems for ARB in Europe
warrant improvement. Collection of data and meta-data needs to
be standardized, otherwise subsequent analysis of the collected
data, especially when comparing different countries, will remain
difficult and external validity will be very low. Additionally, the
frequency of publication of surveillance results needs to be
harmonized. The detection of pathogens spreading over country
borders will never be successful if, for example, surveillance data
collected during January is reported by France in February and by
Germany in August. Clonal spread of a resistant bacterium present
in January in France and Germany might actually appear separated,
solely due to the difference in time-point of reporting. Lastly,
infection control measures necessary to stop such a spread would
always be implemented too late [21].
The results of this review should push forward the debate on
mandatory surveillance for high-priority ARB and restructuring of
current surveillance strategies at national level in Europe. Making
surveillance protocols and results freely accessible is considered a
pillar of the European AMR strategy [22] and should be made an
immediate priority. A platform to exchange experiences and out-
comes between countries must be made available so that lessons
learned from countries with a low endemicity for resistant bacteria
can guide countries with high endemicity. The national plans
should more clearly define the importance of mandatory surveil-
lance and link the resistance rates with clinical data to develop
effective, diagnostic and antibiotic stewardship policies. Technol-
ogies should be shared across Europe to make mandatory surveil-
lance feasible for all nations. For difficult pathogens, particularly H.
pylori, establishment of sentinel surveillance through national
reference or special laboratories could be considered if establish-
ment of mandatory surveillance is not possible but the data should
be reported and published frequently to match the surveillance
results of other priority pathogens. Major stakeholders should
develop a European consensus on the role and significance of
mandatory surveillance of AMR and define implementation, tar-
gets, indicators and dissemination measures. For Europe to serve as
a model region, a common platform for data reporting will increase
timeliness and effectiveness of infection control procedures.Funding
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